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ABSTRACT: 
In this paper we propose a new approach for the design of pharmaceutical 
copayments. We departure from the standard efficiency argument that advocates 
for copayments that are decreasing in the health benefits of the patients in order 
to discipline consumption. Under our approach, copayments are justified by the 
difficulties for the provider to fully fund their health services. 
We use results from the literature on axiomatic bargaining with claims to 
incorporate criteria of distributive justice into the design of copayments. We find 
that equity arguments might lead to a relation between copayments and clinical 
status that diverges from those proposals based on efficiency arguments. In 
particular, we show that equity-based copayments should be increasing rather 
than decreasing in the health benefits that the treatments provide the patients. 
The reason is that a low health benefit implies the patient has an important 
permanent health loss that cannot be avoided with the medication. Equity-based 
copayments, thus, try to avoid a double jeopardy where on top of the health loss, 
the patients also face a substantial monetary cost. 
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There have been proposals to incorporate the clinical eﬀect of a treatment in the design
of copayments. The idea is to link copayments with clinical beneﬁt. The more clinical
beneﬁt for the patient, the lower that patient’s cost share would be. In other words,
more cost-eﬀective treatments should have lower copayments. Linking copayments with
the cost-eﬀectiveness of medical services has been named Value-Base Insurance Design
(VBID).1 Similar proposals have been put forward for public health systems.2 Newhouse
(2006) has also suggested that based on the ﬁndings of behavioral economics, it may not
be suﬃcient to provide enough information to patients to make them take good decisions.
For this reason, he suggests that cost-sharing should be much more speciﬁc in the sense
that it should focus more on medical goods or services that reduce future medical costs
and/or improve health.
One of the main arguments behind this proposal lies in the limited capacity of people
to take the right decisions in the health care market. This argument dates back to the
debate on the interpretation of the demand curve held in the Journal of Health Economics
some time ago. Rice (1992) argued that in presence of copayments patients reduce both
high and low value treatments, that is, they reduce consumption of medical services that
have marginal costs both above and below marginal beneﬁts. Rice argues that patients
do not always have suﬃcient information and experience to make the right choices for
themselves. In this spirit, Fendrick et al (2001) argue that for many medical conditions
the decisions are complex and the responsibility for decision making might best involve
the clinician or the provider of the prescription drug beneﬁt (p. 862). The consequence
of this is that copayments reduce consumption of both high-value and low-value services
(see Chernew (2008) and Chernew and Fendrick (2008) for a summary of the evidence).
For this reason, supporters of VBID suggest that copayments have to be based on the
expected clinical beneﬁt. In this way, patients would only reduce consumption of those
medicines that produce the smaller health beneﬁt. The main objective of this approach
is then to maximize health, that is, eﬃciency. The interesting point here is that this
way of structuring copayments is not based on the assumption that patients have enough
information in order to choose the best treatments, rather the opposite. copayments are
related to health beneﬁts precisely because patients lack enough information to reduce only
consumption of low-value services. It is then assumed that the “architect” of copayments
has this information.
In this paper we want to show that the theoretical arguments behind VBID could be
in conﬂict with equity principles. This problem is especially important if we assume that
1See Fendrick and Chernew (2006).
2See Walley (1998).
2in most cases the patient follows the medical treatment that the doctor considers it is
the best. Why should the patient be “penalized” because he has been unlucky with the
medical treatment that the doctor thinks it is the best? A patient can be unlucky for two
reasons. The ﬁrst is that the treatment is expensive. The second is that the treatment is
not very eﬃcient. Why should he face higher copayments if the best available treatment is
not very eﬃcient? Raising copayments for low-beneﬁtt r e a t m e n t si se v e nm o r ep r o b l e m a t i c
when patients are severely ill. Assume a patient with a severe condition that is unlucky
and the best available treatment for his condition is not very eﬃcient. Should we then
penalize this patient with a higher copayment because he has been unlucky? Or should
we do rather the opposite? In short, the questions we want to address in this paper are
the following: i) which should be the relation between copayments and health beneﬁts if
copayments are based on equity (not on eﬃciency) principles? ii) Would it change under
diﬀerent equity principles? iii) Would it be diﬀerent from eﬃciency based copayment
schemes?
In order to clarify our point we will start assuming (with Fendrick) that the responsi-
bility of the choice of treatment rests in the doctor or in the provider. Assume we have
two patients (or group of patients) with two diﬀerent health problems that need medical
treatment. The patients are advised by their doctors on the medicine that it is best for
them. We could also assume that in both cases beneﬁts outweigh costs so as Pauly and
Blavin (2008) have pointed out there is no moral hazard and we would not need cost
sharing. These treatments should be provided at zero cost since they are treatments that
would be purchased by consumers even if they had to pay full cost. This would be the
logical conclusion of the VBID approach. However, assume that the provider cannot raise
enough money in premiums or taxes in order to cover the full cost of these treatments.
That is, copayments are needed because the provider has problems in funding their health
services and not because governments think that copayments are a good instrument to re-
duce ineﬃcient consumption.3,4 Under these circumstances, which rules should we follow
3We refer to governments since we are more familiar with the role of copayments in public health
systems. To the extent that private insurance companies are under some sort of pressure that makes
easier for them to raise funds using copayments instead of raising premiums, our arguments can be
applied to private settings as well.
4Probably, in an ideal world, this situation would never happen. If a government thinks that a health
treatment produces more beneﬁts than costs but it needs more money to fund the treatment, it can
raise taxes. In practice, this may not happen for several reasons related to public choice problems. For
example, taxpayers may not believe that the government is going to use this money for this purpose, they
may think that the government can reduce ineﬃcient consumption in other areas. These reasons can
make the government reluctant to raise taxes. At the same time, the government can be under pressure
to provide a new medical treatment. Overall, the government can think that some kind of copayment
is an easier way of collecting the funds in order to provide this treatment. Also, in some low income
3in order to design copayments? Apparently, the VBID approach would suggest that we
should use lower copayments for patient(s) whose medicine is more eﬃcient. We will show
that if we design copayments using equity principles, the result could be quite diﬀerent.
We will then move to a diﬀerent situation. We will assume that the two patients
can choose between two diﬀerent medicines. The doctor suggests to each patient several
potential medicines and the patient can choose between them. How would equity-based
copayments work? Would they produce good incentives to patients? As it will become
clear in the paper, the answer depends on the precise criterion we use in designing the
copayments.
The theoretical framework that we propose in order to answer this research question is
the so-called “axiomatic bargaining” literature. This literature interprets the budget allo-
cation problem as a bargaining process between agents and advocates for sharing solutions
that fulﬁll a series of a priori desirable properties (axioms). We will use this framework
because it is a theory speciﬁcally designed to incorporate fairness considerations (through
t h ea x i o m si m p o s e d )a n d ,i nt h i sp a p e r ,w ec o n t e m p l a t ec o p a y m e n t sa sap u r e l ye q u i t y
issue.
The use of an axiomatic bargaining framework to solve a resource allocation problem
in health care was ﬁrst suggested by Clark (1995), who compared the health care budget
allocation between two patients under four alternative rules. More recently, Cuadras-
Morató et al. (2001) have enriched Clark’s original setting by allowing for the possibility
that agents have “claims” about the resources they would like to receive.5
There are diﬀerent possible interpretations of the claims in the context of the allocation
of health care resources. In this paper we will consider two alternative deﬁnitions that, as
it will become clear in what follows, will crucially determine the outcome of the resource
allocation problem. First, we can deﬁne the claim of an agent as the point up to which
the marginal productivity of resources is positive. This interpretation coincides with
the deﬁnition of need ‘as capacity to beneﬁt’ suggested by Williams (1974). Under this
approach, the claim of an agent is “constrained” by the capacity of the medical technology
to provide a health beneﬁt. An alternative is to consider the claim as an “unconstrained”
countries the tax system may not be very well developed. Maybe, this argument is less relevant in a
private health care market since an insurance company can raise insurance premiums to fund treatments
that produce more beneﬁts than costs and consumers can accept this increase in premiums since they
can link this increase in premiums to access of better medical treatments. However, it can also be the
case that for private insurers it is easier to justify in front of their customers the use of copayments than
a raise in premiums, even for medical treatments that produce more beneﬁts than costs. If this is the
case, our argument can be also applied to private insurers. If this is not the case, our paper would be
less relevant in private settings.
5This analysis is based on the literature on axiomatic bargaining with claims pioneered by Chun and
Thomson (1992).
4right of the agent. In this case, as in Cuadras-Morató et al. (2001), the claim can be seen
‘as an exogenously determined amount of health to which everyone is entitled because
there is a socio-political agreement about it. For instance, the claim could be ﬁxed at 70
QALYs, if this is the (at birth) life expectancy adjusted for quality of the population’.
We build on a setting similar to that in Cuadras-Morató et al. (2001) and we study
the properties that copayments would have under two classic resource-allocation rules:
The proportional and the equal-loss solution. The proportional solution allocates utilities
across agents in a way that is proportional to their unsatisﬁed claims.6 The equal-loss
solution equalizes across agents the losses in utility relative to their claim point, with the
restriction that no agent ends up being worse oﬀ than at his initial allocation.7
The two allocation rules diﬀer in the set of copayments they give rise to. Nevertheless,
they share some basic features. First, when we consider the ‘constrained’ version of the
claims, the two rules yield copayments that are based only on the costs of the treatment
with no inﬂuence at all of the health beneﬁts. The proportional criterion suggests that
copayments should be a ﬁx e dp e r c e n t a g eo ft h ec o s to ft h et r e a t m e n t( i nl i n ew i t ht h e
current system of copayments in countries such as France or Spain). The equal-loss
criterion advocates for copayments of a ﬁxed magnitude (as it is the case in the UK).
When the claims of the agents are ‘unconstrained’, a link between health beneﬁts
and copayments emerges. In this case, however, the standard eﬃciency argument that
the more clinical beneﬁtf o rt h ep a t i e n t ,t h el o w e rt h a tp a t i e n t ’ sc o s t - s h a r es h o u l db e ,
is completely turned on its head: Under the two solutions, the lower the health beneﬁt
that the treatment can provide to the patient, the lower the copayment he should face.
The reason is that a low health beneﬁt implies the patient has an important permanent
health loss that cannot be avoided with the medication. Thus, equity-based copayments
t r yt oa v o i dad o u b l ej e o p a r d yw h e r eo nt o po f the health loss, the patients also face
a substantial monetary cost. As a result, the agent who has a worse health-recovery
possibility is favoured through a larger subsidization.8
We ﬁnally assess the properties of the equity-based copayments in terms of incentives,
by allowing patients to choose from a set of possible treatments. In this respect, we
ﬁnd that only the proportional copayments have good eﬃciency properties as, contrary
to the equal-loss copayments, they induce the patient to choose the most cost-eﬀective
treatment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model
and presents the solutions we will use in the resource allocation problem. Sections 3
6Historically, this has been advocated as a reasonable criteria of justice since the works of Aristotele.
For a formal analysis of this solution see Chun and Thomson (1992)
7See Chun (1988) for a detailed analysis of this rule.
8Note that this reasoning is in line with the fair-innings argument. See, for instance Williams (1997).
5and 4 compute the copayment structures with constrained and unconstrained claims,
respectively. Section 5 studies the incentives that the equity-based copayments provide to
patients. Section 6 introduces income considerations in the model. Section 7 provides a
generalization of the basic set-up for n diﬀerent treatments. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Basic Framework
There are two patients (or patient groups), N = {1,2}, w h oa r ei nn e e do fap h a r m a -
ceutical treatment to recover from a certain health loss.9 Each patient has an initial
health status si. This health status is measured by a monetary transformation of the
QALYs left of life expectancy. Thus, both the quality and length of life may be taken
into consideration.
Patients have access to drugs that can improve their health status. Each patient has
been prescribed a particular drug and, hence, it is not at patients’ discretion to choose
their preferred pharmaceutical. For patient i, the consumption of drug i can provide him
with an extra hi QALYs. Hence, hi is a measure of the eﬀectiveness of the treatment for
illness i. W i t ht h i s ,w ec a nd e ﬁne by Hi (hi|si) the monetary value of the hi additional
QALYs given by drug i, conditional on an initial level of health si.
The treatment needed by patient i has a total cost pi and the patient faces a copayment
rate of ci ∈ [0,1].10 Thus, we can deﬁne the utility of agent i (in monetary terms) as:
Ui = si + Hi (hi|si) − cipi (1)
For simplicity, we abstract from any income eﬀect, i.e., we do not include the income
of the patients as a determinant of the copayment levels they will face. Moreover, we
assume that all treatments have a positive net beneﬁt( i . e . ,t h a tβi ≡ Hi (hi|si) − pi > 0,
for every i).11
Finally, each patient has a claim, or expectation, εi about the health status he would
like to reach. As stated in the Introduction, this claim admits two interpretations. First,
it can be interpreted as an exogenously determined amount of health (a life expectancy
9We restrict ourselves to the case with only two groups of patients to simplify the exposition. The
analysis of the general case is presented in Section 7.
10Note that pi does not measure the cost of a single dose of the drug, but that of the whole duration
of the treatment. Therefore, copayments are deﬁned over the total expenditures that the patient makes
during the treatment.
11The abstraction from income eﬀects is inessential for our main insights. See Section 6 for a version
of the model that incorporates this feature.
6measure) that each patient thinks he deserves (denote it by ei). This vector might repre-
sent, for instance, a socioeconomic agreement of the quality-adjusted life expectancy that
each agent should be entitled to. Given this claim and the treatment possibilities, we can
deﬁne λi ≡ ei−(si + Hi (hi|si)) ≥ 0 as the value of the unrecoverable health (the value of
the loss in health that the treatment cannot bring back the patient, relative to his ideal
health state). Alternative, the claim can be constrained to be the utility in the absence
of copayments, i.e., εi = si + Hi (hi|si). This alternative leaves aside the idea that each
person has the “right” to enjoy an exogenously determined amount of health. Instead,
it determines the ideal point through the health improvements that the treatment can
provide to the patients. This assumption, therefore, links the right of the patients to
request a higher utility in the ﬁnal sharing to their possibilities of recovery.
The health authority (HA) is responsible for paying all the costs of the treatments not
levied through the copayments. The total budget to be allocated to drug ﬁnancing is B.
Thus, the budget constraint faced by the HA is given by:
X
i∈{1,2}
(1 − ci)pi ≤ B. (2)
To make the analysis non-trivial, we assume that it is impossible to simultaneously
fully subsidize both patients. Formally:
p1 + p2 >B . (3)
2.2 The Resource Allocation Problem
The impossibility to fully subsidize both patients generates a resource allocation problem
with claims. The feasibility set is determined by the vectors of copayments rates that
are simultaneously “aﬀordable” for the HA. As in any other allocation problem in the
presence of scarcity, there are three key elements that need to be identiﬁed: The utility
possibility frontier, the disagreement point and the resource allocation rule to be used.
The utility possibility frontier of the allocation problem relates the utilities that can
be awarded to each patient with the amount of resources available to distribute. From
(1) we get:
cipi = si + Hi (hi|si) − Ui.
Substituting the equation above into (2), rearranging terms and binding the budget con-
straint we get X
i∈{1,2}
Ui = B +
X
i∈{1,2}
(si + Hi (hi|si) − pi). (4)
We also need to deﬁne the “disagreement” or reference point of the problem. Formally,
t h i si st h ev e c t o ro fu t i l i t yl e v e l st h a tt h ea g e n t sw o u l do b t a i ni nc a s et h e yd i dn o tr e a c h
7an agreement about the distribution of the resources. In our setting it corresponds to the
value of the agents’ utility in the absence of any subsidization of the drugs (si+Hi (hi|si)−
pi).
In this paper we compute those copayments that satisfy a series of “desirable” dis-
tributive axioms.12 We will use two solution concepts that satisfy some basic properties:
(i) Pareto optimality: There is no feasible alternative solution that is preferred by all
agents; (ii) Symmetry: Agents with equal characteristics should be treated equally; (iii)
Monotonicity: If the feasible set (i.e., the budget to be shared) expands, other things
being equal, all agents should be better oﬀ.
The ﬁrst solution concept we use is the Proportional Solution. This solution corre-
sponds to the maximal point inside the feasible set in the segment connecting the dis-
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.
We also consider the equal loss solution that allocates utilities in such a way that the
agents end up at the same “distance” from their ideal point. If the claims of the patients







is given by the utility levels
³
˜ Uel







1 + ˜ U
el
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provided they fulﬁll the restriction that copayments have to be smaller or equal than 1.
Formally, for every i ∈ {1,2}
˜ U
el
i ≥ si + Hi (hi|si) − pi (5)
Notice that these two solutions diﬀer in the role they give to the value of the utility of
the agents in the absence of any subsidization. In the proportional solution, this utility
level is relevant, as the ﬁnal allocation will be proportional to the diﬀerence between
12See Clarke (1995) for a ﬁrst application of axiomatic bargaining to prority setting in health care.
8the claim of the patient and his disagreement point. In the equal-loss solution, on the
contrary, the disagreement point only sets a minimum reservation utility that is secured
for all patients but, other than that, it plays no role on the allocation of resources.
The following sections compute the copayments for each of these solution concepts.13
3 Copayments with Constrained Claims
As stated in the Introduction, the notion of claims admits several interpretations. Con-
sider, ﬁrst, that these ideal points are the maximal utilities the agents can obtain con-
strained by their initial health state and the treatment possibilities available. Formally,
this corresponds to a setting where the claims of the patients are εi = si + Hi (hi|si).
In what follows, we compute the optimal copayments in this scenario.
3.1 The Proportional Copayments
As we said, the proportional criterion allocates the resources available to share (B)a m o n g
the individuals in such a way that their resulting utilities are proportional to their unsat-
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2 ) is obtained
by binding the restriction for this patient and allocating the remaining budget to the other.
From here it is straightforward to ﬁnd that:
13To ease the exposition, we will consider a simpliﬁed environment where the budget constraint is
so tight that it prevents from fully subsidizing any patient. Formally, this amounts to assuming that
B<min{p1 + p2}.
9Lemma 1 The utilities awarded to each patient under the proportional criterion with
constrained claims are given by:
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it is straightforward to obtain that:
Proposition 1 The copayments charged to each patient (i = {1,2}) under the propor-







Note ﬁrst that, since B<p 1+p2 it always holds that c
pr_c
i > 0, so both patients have
to pay part of their treatment. Moreover, under the proportional criterion, patients are
never charged the whole price of the drug (i.e., c
pr_c
i < 1 for every i) and, hence, both
patients are always subsidized. Thus, even if the proportional criterion gives priority to
o n ep a t i e n to v e rt h eo t h e r ,t h i sp r i o r i t i z a t i o ni sn e v e ra b s o l u t e .
The interpretation of c
pr_c
i is very simple. It is a copayment that depends only on
the overall shortage of resources. The copayment rate does not diﬀer across patients
depending on the relative costs of their drugs. It is an homogeneous system in which all
patients pay the same percentage of the cost of the drug.14
In addition to this, the copayment charged to patient i is increasing in the cost of
drug i. The reason is that an increase in the cost of a drug means a reduction in the
subsidizing possibilities for the health authority. Given a ﬁxed budget B, an increase in
pi implies that a larger share of the cost has to be charged to the patients. This, indeed,
causes that not only the copayment charged to patient i, but also the copayments charged
to the patient who use the other treatment, will increase if drug i becomes more costly.
In this sense, the proportional criterion implies that the cost of a given drug is not the
sole responsibility of its user, instead, these costs are “socialized” across all patients.
14The copayment systems in several European countries such as Belgium, France, Greece, Luxembourg,
Portugal or Spain are based (though with some speciﬁcf e a t u r e so ne a c hc o u n t r y )o nt h i si d e ao fc h a r g i n g
the patients a ﬁxed proportion of the price of the drug.
103.2 The Equal-loss Copayments
As already deﬁned, the equal-loss criterion allocates resources in such a way that the
distance between the patients’ utility and their ideal (claim) point is equalized. Formally,
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binding the restriction for this patient and allocating the remaining budget to the other.
Assume, without loss of generality, that patient 1 faces a cheaper drug than those of
type 2 (i.e., that p1 <p 2). It is straightforward to obtain that:
Lemma 2 The utilities awarded to each patient under the equal-loss criterion with
constrained claims are given by:
• If p1 ≥ p2 − B, then:
U
el_c
1 = s1 + H1 (h1|s1) −




2 = s2 + H2 (h2|s2) −
(p1 + p2 − B)
2
.
• If p1 <p 2 − B, then:
U
el_c
1 = s1 + H1 (h1|s1) − p1
U
el_c
2 = s2 + H2 (h2|s2) − p2 + B.
This solution is divided in two diﬀerent regions depending on whether when equalizing
across patients the losses in utility relative to their claim point, patient 1 ends up being
worse oﬀ than at his initial (unsubsidized) utility, or not. If this happens, the solution
leaves this patient fully unsubsidized and allocates the whole budget on the other patient.
Once the utilities are computed, it is straightforward to obtain that:
11Proposition 2 The copayments charged to each patient (i =1 ,2) under the propor-
tional criterion with constrained claims are given by:
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From the above proposition, we see the ﬁrst important distributional diﬀerence be-
tween the proportional and the equal-loss prioritizations. Under the equal-loss criterion
it can be the case that one patient has to bear the full cost of the drug, feature that never
occurred in the proportional case (where ci w a sa l w a y ss m a l l e rt h a no n e ) .H e n c e ,w h e n
the prioritization is based on an equal-loss argument, it may give an absolute priority to
ﬁnance one illness and, hence, lead to the exclusion of the other.15 This occurs if one
treatment is very cheap relative to the other one. Both treatments are subsidized when
the costs of the two drugs are relatively similar. The copayment system, in such a case,
only depends on the cost of the treatment, being inversely related to it: If drug i is more
costly than drug j, the percentage of the cost paid by patient i is smaller than the one
paid by patient j, in such a way that the total expenditures made on the drugs (cipi)a r e




p1 + p2 − B
2
.
This, in fact, can be seen as a copayment system where all drugs face a constant total
copayment.16 Since the copayment is ﬁx e do na b s o l u t et e r m s ,i tc a nb er e i n t e r p r e t e da s
being a decreasing proportion of the total cost of the drug.
This diﬀerence with the proportional case is driven by the way the solution compen-
sates the diﬀerences in costs. Under the proportional solution an increase in the cost of
one drug implied an increase in the copayment rates for all drugs. Under the equal-loss
approach, on the contrary, the more costly drug i is, the smaller the copayment charged
to patient i. Even if a higher cost for drug i implies, on the overall, a reduction in the
subsidizing possibilities for the HA, the eﬀect that dominates is that the higher the cost
15Note that, in this case, the copayment for the drug that is subsidized is increasing in its costs. This
is an artiﬁcial feature generated by the fact that now all the budget is allocated to a single drug.
16This system is used in some European countries such as Austria, Germany or Great Britain (where
there is a ﬁxed payment of 9.76€ per prescription).
12of one patient’s drug, the less utility he will have relative to his ideal point and, therefore,
the larger subsidization he should receive in order to compensate. This increased egali-
tarianism of the equal-loss rule, relative to the proportional one, causes that, as a result
o ft h ei n c r e a s ei nt h ep r i c eo fd r u gi, it is patient j, whose drug’s price has not changed,
the one who is charged with a higher copayment rate .
4 Copayments with Unconstrained Claims
The purpose of this section is to illustrate how the main characteristics of the copayments
change when we move to a setting with unconstrained claims.
4.1 The Proportional Copayments
Using the fact that, now εi = ei and proceeding analogously as in Section 3, we have
















1 + ˜ U
pr
2 = B +( s1 + H1 (h1|s1) − p1)+( s2 + H2 (h2|s2) − p2).
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pr





2 − (s2 + H2 (h2|s2) − p2)
λ2 + p2
,
provided they fulﬁll the restriction that copayments have to be smaller or equal than 1.
Formally, for every i ∈ {1,2}
˜ U
pr
i ≥ si + Hi (hi|si) − pi (8)




2 ) is obtained
by binding the restriction for this patient and allocating the remaining budget to the other
one.
From here it is straightforward to ﬁnd that:
Lemma 3 The utilities awarded to each patient under the proportional criterion with
unconstrained claims are given by:
U
pr_u
1 = s1 + H1 (h1|s1) − p1 +
λ1 + p1




2 = s2 + H2 (h2|s2) − p2 +
λ2 + p2
λ1 + p1 + λ2 + p2
B.








it is straightforward to obtain that:
Proposition 3 The copayments charged to each patient (i =1 ,2) by the proportional





pi (λ1 + p1 + λ2 + p2)
B
Analogously as in the constrained scenario, under the proportional solution, patients
are never charged the whole price of the drug (i.e., c
pr_u
i < 1 for every i) and, hence,
the prioritization among patients is never absolute. Also again, an increase in the cost
of a drug increases all copayments charged, not only that of the patient whose drug has
become more expensive.
Interestingly, with unconstrained claims a new eﬀect appears that links copayments
with health beneﬁts through the unrecoverable health of patients. In particular, we ﬁnd
that the copayment for patient i is decreasing in his unrecoverable health (λi). This is
a fair innings eﬀe c t :I ft h ep a t i e n th a sap e r m a n e n th e a l t hl o s st h a tc a n n o tb ea v o i d e d
with the medication, at least, he should not pay a high proportion of the treatment costs.
This way the copayments try to avoid a double jeopardy situation, by favoring the patient
that has a worse health-recovery possibility through a larger subsidization.
It is interesting to deepen a bit more on the distributional properties of the copayments
derived. First, we can identify when the copayment charged to one patient will exceed












From here we get two insights: (i) As already said, the larger the value of the unrecoverable
health of each patient, the lower the copayment and, hence, ceteris paribus the agent with
al o w e rv a l u eo fλ will pay more. (ii) Other things being equal, the higher the cost of a
drug, the higher the copayment the patient will face. Note that, at a ﬁrst sight, this may
seem counterintuitive and against the ideas of distributive justice we are putting forward
in this analysis. To clarify this, consider now the overall amount of resources allocated to
each patient from the health authority (i.e., the total subsidy: Subi =( 1− ci)pi). It is
straightforward to ﬁnd that,
Sub
pr_u
1 <S u b
pr_u
2 ⇐⇒ λ1 + p1 <λ 2 + p2.
14When we consider the overall subsidy, therefore, the apparent contradiction disappears as,
other things being equal, the patient buying a more costly drug always receives a larger
share of the total budget. Nevertheless, as allocating more resources from one patient can
only be done at the expense of diverting resources from the other, these extra resources
given to the more costly drug do not fully compensate the increase in costs, in such a way
that a more costly drug will face a higher copayment.
4.2 The Equal-loss Copayments
The equal-loss criterion allocates resources in such a way that the distance between the






is given by the utility levels
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1 + ˜ U
el
2 = B +( s1 + H1 (h1|s1) − p1)+( s2 + H2 (h2|s2) − p2)
e1 − ˜ U
el
1 = e2 − ˜ U
el
2 ,
provided they fulﬁll the restriction that copayments have to be smaller or equal than 1.
Formally, for every i ∈ {1,2}
˜ U
el
i ≥ si + Hi (hi|si) − pi (9)







binding the restriction for this patient and allocating the remaining budget to the other
one.
Assume, without loss of generality, that patient 1 has a smaller value of λ + p than
patient 2. It is straightforward to obtain that:
Lemma 4 The utilities awarded to each patient by the equal-loss criterion with un-
constrained claims are given by:
• If λ1 + p1 ≥ λ2 + p2 − B,
U
el_u
1 = s1 + H1 (h1|s1) −




2 = s2 + H2 (h2|s2) −
(p1 + p2 − B) − λ2 + λ1
2
• If λ1 + p1 <λ 2 + p2 − B, then:
U
el_u
1 = s1 + H1 (h1|s1) − p1
U
el_u
2 = s2 + H2 (h2|s2) − p2 + B.
15As in the constrained case, the equal-loss solution is divided in two diﬀerent regions
depending on the utility that patients achieve when equalizing across groups their losses
in utility relative to their ideal health state. If the equalization implies that one patient is
worse oﬀ, relative to his initial (unsubsidized) utility, then the solution leaves this patient
at their initial utility, and allocates the whole budget to the other patient.
Once the utilities are computed, it is straightforward to obtain that:
Proposition 4 The copayments charged to each patient (i =1 ,2) under the equal-loss
criterion with unconstrained claims are given by:




(p1 + p2 − B)+( λj − λi)
2pi
.










As in the constrained case, the equal-loss solution may leave some patients unsub-
sidized. The only diﬀerence is that before, the prioritization was solely based on the
treatment costs, while in this scenario the sum of the health cost (λ)a n dt h em o n e t a r y
cost (p) are the basis for the prioritization. As a result, if one patient has a very low value
of λ + p then he may have to bear the full cost of the treatment.
In the case when both patients receive a positive share of the budget, the copayment
structure results from the combination of two eﬀects. First, analogously to the propor-
tional prioritization, there is a fair innings eﬀect: the larger the unrecoverable health of
patient i (i.e., λi = ei −(si + Hi (hi|si))) the smaller the copayment he is entitled to pay.
Secondly, there is an eﬀect that compensates for the diﬀerences in the costs of the drugs.
To understand the distributional diﬀerences with the proportional case, let us com-
pute, ﬁrst when the copayment charged to one patient will exceed that of the other.





2 ⇐⇒ λ1 <λ 2 − (p1 − p2)
µ




First, as in the proportional case, ceteris paribus the agent with a lower value of λ will be
charged a higher copayment. Nevertheless, contrary to the proportional case, the higher
the cost of a drug, the lower the copayment the patient will face. Consider now, as we did
before, the overall amount of resources allocated to each patient from the health authority.
Sub
el_u
1 <S u b
el_u
2 ⇐⇒ λ1 + p1 <λ 2 + p2.
16This condition is exactly the same as in the proportional case. Therefore, the two rules
share a main basic distributive property: the patient that faces a larger overall cost (i.e.,
the sum of his unrecoverable health loss and the monetary cost of the drug) should receive
a larger share of the budget. What diﬀers under the two sharing rules is the intensity of
the cost compensation, that is larger for the equal-loss rule that is, on the overall, more
egalitarian.
5E ﬃciency Considerations
As we have said in the Introduction in this paper we implicitly acknowledge that the re-
sponsibility of the choice of treatment rests in the doctor or in the provider. Our analysis,
thus, explicitly departs from the usual eﬃciency-enhancing role assigned to pharmaceuti-
cal copayments as we have not aimed at designing copayments that rationalize consump-
tion or inﬂuence patients’ choice among diﬀerent treatment possibilities. However, at this
point we can easily assess how the copayments that emerge from both the proportional
and the equal-loss criterion provide incentives to the patients. Note that, as the copay-
ments with constrained claims do not depend on the health beneﬁts of the patient, we
restrict the eﬃciency analysis to the unconstrained scenario.
Consider that, instead of having two patients each one with its prescribed medicine
and with no possibility to substitute among drugs, we face a single patient who has the
capacity to choose among drugs 1 and 2, both of them being alternative treatments.
In such a setting, the incentive role of copayments becomes relevant. We would like
copayment schemes that induce the patient to make the “right” choice, i.e., that patients
decide to buy the drug with the highest cost-eﬀectiveness ratio or net beneﬁt.
If we compare the net utility of a patient when purchasing either of the two drugs we
can conclude that:
Proposition 5 With unconstrained claims the proportional criterion generates a copay-
ment scheme that provides the patient with incentives to purchase the drug with the highest
net beneﬁt, while the equal-loss criterion does not.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
We observe how only the proportional copayments are compatible with providing the
patient with right incentives. The main reason lies in the higher egalitarianism of the
equal-loss rule. As it downgrades the impact of the price of the drug on the value of the
copayment, this is detrimental for the provision of incentives.
176 Introducing Income Eﬀects
The purpose of this section is to illustrate how the introduction of income considerations,
will not alter the main insights that can be extracted from our analysis. For this purpose,
assume that agents are endowed with a simple utility function that is non-separable in
health (ηi)a n di n c o m e( Ii)o ft h ef o r mUi (ηi,I i)=ηiIi. Since the utility function is not
quasilinear in money, income eﬀects will be present. For this exercise, let us focus on the
case with unconstrained claims and, therefore, assume the claim of agent i is given by
ei.17.
Taking into account that the net income of an agent is the diﬀerence between his initial
wealth (measured by mi)a n dt h ec o s to ft h et r e a t m e n t( cipi)w eh a v et h a t :




This allows us to write the budget constraint faced by the health authority as:







with ηi = si + Hi (hi|si) being the post-treatment health of agent i.
This restatement of the budget constraint allows us to recompute the copayments
under the two rules under consideration.
Proposition 6 When the utility of the agents is of the form Ui (ηi,I i)=ηiIi, the co-
payments charged to each patient (i =1 ,2) under the proportional criterion with





pi (η2 (λ1 + p1η1)+η1 (λ2 + p2η2))
B
Proof. See Appendix A.2
We can see how, despite the introduction of income eﬀects alters the shape of the
copayment rate, it preserves the main insight of the analysis: the larger the value of the
unrecoverable utility loss the agent will face, the smaller the copayment. Note that, in
this case, the value of λ = ei − ηimi captures two eﬀects. First, there is the fair-innings
eﬀect by which, an agent with worse health recovery potential should be prioritized in
o r d e rt oa v o i dad o u b l e - j e o p ardy. Second, with income eﬀects, the initial wealth of the
agent also plays a role. The poorer the patient (i.e., the lower mi) the smaller should also
b et h ev a l u eo ft h ec o p a y m e n t .
We now show how these same insights emerge under the equal-loss prioritization.
17Note that, in this case, the claim is not deﬁned only in terms of health beneﬁts. ei measures the
ideal level of utility the agent would like to enjoy.
18Proposition 7 When the utility of the agents is of the form Ui (ηi,I i)=ηiIi, the copay-
ments charged to each patient (i =1 ,2) under the equal-loss criterion with uncon-
strained claims are given by:




(p1 + p2 − B)η1 +( λj − λi)
pi (η1 + η2)









Proof. See Appendix A.3
7 Design of Copayments with n Patients
In this Section we compute the complete vector of copayments in a more general environ-
ment where there are n diﬀerent types of illnesses and where it may be possible to fully
subsidize some (but not all) types of patients.18 As it will become clear in what follows,
the possibility that for some patients the cost of the drugs is fully subsidized makes the
complete characterization of the solutions be more complex. In particular, to compute
the copayment vector we need to resort to an iterative process.
Let us start, ﬁrst, with the proportional criterion. First of all, order the set of patients
according to
λi




p2 ≤ ... ≤ λn
pn.
The algorithm is deﬁned iteratively. At any iteration t t h e r ei sas e to fp a t i e n t s
Nt = {1,2,...n t} whose subsidization remains undecided, with nt identifying the patient
with the highest order in Nt. The remaining budget to share is Bt. For the ﬁrst iteration
let us deﬁne N1 = {1,2,...n}, i.e., the whole set of patients according to the ordering
above and also let B1 = B (the whole budget is available to share).
T h ea l g o r i t h mw o u l db ea sf o l l o w s :
At any iteration t ≥ 1,
a) If Nt = {nt}, then cpr
nt =1− Bt
pnt and the algorithm stops. Otherwise, move to b)
18We focus on the unconstrained claims case, as it is the one involving the higher complexity in the
resulting copayments.
19b) Split the budget Bt b e t w e e nt h es e to fa g e n t si nNt according to the Proportional cri-




˜ Uj = Bt +
X
j∈Nt
(sj + Hj (hj|sj) − pj).
∀i,j ∈ Nt,
˜ Ui − (si + Hi (hi|si) − pi)
λi + pi
=
˜ Uj − (sj + Hj (hj|sj) − pj)
λj + pj
Compute the vector ˜ c = {˜ c1,˜ c2,...˜ cnt} using:
˜ ci =
si + Hi (hi|si) − ˜ Ui
pi




and the algorithm stops. Otherwise, move to c).
c) cpr
nt =0 , and move to iteration t +1with Bt+1 = Bt − pnt and Nt+1 = Nt\{nt}.
This iterative process computes the whole vector of copayments. These can have two
conﬁgurations. It can be the case that all copayments are strictly positive (i.e., there is
no type of agent that is fully subsidized). This occurs if no patient has a very large
λi
pi,







j=1 (λj + pi)
B,
that is simply the n-type generalization of the copayments obtained in Section 4. In the
other conﬁguration some types of patients, those with a large
λi
pi, face a zero copayment,
while for the remaining ones, the budget that is left after fully subsidizing this set of
patients, is split according to the rule above.
Two issues are key in this proportional prioritization. First, what determines whether
the patient will face a positive or a zero copayment is how large is the unrecoverable health,
relative to the cost of the treatment. The larger is this health loss, the more likely it is
that the patient’s treatment is fully subsidized.19 Secondly, analogously as in the case
with two types, no patient has to face the whole cost of the treatment. The prioritization
always subsidizes a fraction of the cost of the treatment.
The principles that lie behind the proportional prioritization can be better illustrated
if we focus on the case where the copayment is positive and smaller than 1 for all types
19Note that this feature did not appear in Section 4, as there we assumed that the budget was not
enough to fully subsidize any of the two groups of patients.
20of patients. In this case, i.e., if cj ∈ (0,1) for every j, if we compute the total amount of
subsidy that each type of patient receives (denote it by Subj ≡ pj − cjpj)w eg e tt h a t :
Subj =
λi + pi Pn
j=1 (λj + pi)
B.
Hence, the fraction of the budget that is allocated to each type is determined by the total
cost faced by these patients, i.e., not only the monetary cost (pi)b u ta l s ot h eh e a l t hl o s s
(λi) they incur.
Let us move now to the equal-loss criterion and order the set of patients according to
λi, in such a way that λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ ... ≤ λn.
The algorithm is again deﬁned iteratively. At any iteration t there is a set of patients
Nt whose subsidization remains undecided, with nt identifying the patient with the highest
order in Nt. The remaining budget to share is Bt. Also, at each iteration deﬁne αt as the
element in Nt that minimizes λi + pi. Formally, αt =a r gm i n
i∈Nt
λi + pi.
For the ﬁrst iteration let us deﬁne N1 = {1,2,...n}, i.e., the whole set of patients
according to the ordering above and also let B1 = B (the whole budget is available to
share).
T h ea l g o r i t h mw o u l db ea sf o l l o w s :
At any iteration t ≥ 1,
a) If Nt, consists of more than one type of patients, move to b). Otherwise, denote by h
this remaining type of patient. We compute cel






h > 0 the
algorithm stops. Otherwise, move to the ﬁrst iteration of sub-routine a0).
b) Split the budget Bt between the set of agents in Nt according to the Equal-loss cri-




˜ Uj = Bt +
X
j∈Nt
(sj + Hj (hj|sj) − pj).
∀i,j ∈ Nt,e i − ˜ Ui = ej − ˜ Uj.
Compute the vector ˜ c using:
˜ ci =
si + Hi (hi|si) − ˜ Ui
pi
If ˜ cαt ≤ 1, move to c). Otherwise, cel
αt =1 , and move to iteration t+1with Bt+1 = Bt
and Nt+1 = Nt\{αt}.




and the algorithm stops. Otherwise, cel
nt =0 , and move to iteration t +1with
Bt+1 = Bt − pnt and Nt+1 = Nt\{nt}.
Sub-routine a0). At any iteration τ there is a set of patients N0
τ whose subsidization
can be altered with respect to what the main routine of the algorithm proposed. The
remaining budget to share is B0
τ. Also, at each iteration deﬁne ωτ as the element in
N0
τ that maximizes λi + pi. Formally, ωτ =a r g m a x
i∈N0
τ
λi + pi. In the ﬁrst iteration of the
sub-routine, we let N0
1 be the set of patients who, in the main routine of the algorithm,
received no subsidization. Formally N0
1 is such that for every j ∈ N0
1,c el
j =1 . Also, we let
B0
1 = Bt − ph.
At any iteration of the sub-routine τ ≥ 1:
i) Take agent ωτ and recompute its copayment according to cel















The fact that when the prioritization is based on an equal-loss argument, it may lead
to the exclusion of some of the patients, complicates the computation of the optimal
copayments. Now, the resulting vector of copayments might feature: i) Some patients
facing a zero copayment (those with a large unrecoverable health loss, relative to the
others), ii) some patients facing a full copayment (those with a small value of λ+p), and
iii) the remaining ones being only partially subsidized. Copayments for these latter types
















Analogously as in the proportional scenario, the principles that lie behind the equal-
loss prioritization can be better illustrated if we focus on the case where the copayment
is positive and smaller than 1 for all types of patients. In this case, i.e., if cj ∈ (0,1) for
every j, if we compute the total amount of expenditures that each type of patient bears
( d e n o t ei tb yExpj ≡ cjpj)w eg e tt h a t :
Expj =
Pn









Hence, under the equal-loss criterion, the expenditures that all types of patients have to
incur are the sum of: i) An equal division of the shortage of resources relative to the
22total expenditure in prescriptions and ii) a correction term that depends on the value
of the unrecoverable health of each type of patient, relative to the average of the whole
population. If one patient faces a larger than average permanent health loss, he pays less.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have proposed a new way to address the problem of designing pharma-
ceutical copayments. We have departured from the traditional eﬃciency argument that
advocates for copayments that are inversely related to the health beneﬁts of the pharma-
ceuticals. We have proposed, instead, an environment where moral hazard arguments are
absent, as we assume the responsibility of the choice of treatment rests in the doctor or
in the provider, rather than in the patient himself. The rationale for positive copayments
in this setting lies in the impossibility of the health authority to fully subsidize the costs
of the treatments.
We have used results from the literature on axiomatic bargaining with claims to in-
corporate criteria of distributive justice into the design of copayments. We have studied
two alternative rules, the proportional and the equal-loss rules, under two alternative
interpretations of the claims of the agents.
Under constrained claims we have found copayments that replicate the two most com-
mon systems currently employed in Europe. The proportional criterion suggests that
copayments should be a ﬁxed percentage of the cost of the treatment (as it occurs in
France or Spain, for instance); while the equal-loss criterion advocates for copayments of
a ﬁxed magnitude (as in the UK).
We, then, analysed the unconstrained claims scenario, where we showed, interestingly,
that arguments based on equity and not on eﬃciency can justify the use of diﬀerent
copayments according to health beneﬁts. However, equity arguments lead to a relation
between copayments and clinical status that diverges from proposals based on eﬃciency
arguments. In particular, we have shown that equity-based copayments should be in-
creasing rather than decreasing in the health beneﬁts that the treatments provide the
patients. The main reason is that a low health beneﬁt implies the patient has an impor-
tant permanent health loss that cannot be avoided with the medication. The allocation
rules try to avoid a double jeopardy where on top of the health loss, the patients also
face a substantial monetary cost. As a result, the agent who has a worse health-recovery
possibility is favoured through a larger subsidization
We have also shown that, if we analyse the eﬃciency performance of the copayments
proposed, only the proportional criterion yields a copayment system that provides patients
with incentives to purchase the most cost-eﬃcient treatment. The higher egalitarianism
23of the equal-loss rule prevents it from providing the appropriate incentives to the patient.
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26A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider, without loss of generality that drug 1 has a larger net beneﬁtt h a nd r u g2, and
recall that βi = Hi (hi|si) − pi denotes the net beneﬁto fd r u gi.
First of all, since it is a single patient who chooses among the two drugs, we have that
s1 = s2 = s and e1 = e2 = e.
With this simpliﬁcation we can write the net utility of the patient, under the propor-
tional rule, when purchasing drug i as:
U
pr
i = s + βi +
e − s + βi
2(e − s) − β1 − β2
B.














2(e − s) − β1 − β2
¶
.




2 if and only if
1 −
B
2(e − s) − β1 − β2
> 0 ⇐⇒ 2(e − s) − β1 − β2 >B
Using the fact that βi = Hi (hi|si) − pi, and λi = ei − (si + Hi (hi|si)) ≥ 0, the above
condition is equivalent to
λ1 + λ2 >B− p1 − p2.
And this always holds since, by construction, B<p 1 + p2.
We proceed analogously for the equal-loss rule. We can write the net utility of the




2s + B + β1 + β2
2
.
From here it follows directly that Uel
1 = Uel
2 .T h i sc o m p l e t e st h ep r o o f .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 6



























1 − η1 (m1 − p1)




2 − η2 (m2 − p2)
e2 − η2 (m2 − p2)
,
27provided they fulﬁll the restriction that copayments have to be smaller or equal than 1.
Formally, for every i ∈ {1,2}
˜ U
pr
i ≥ ηi (mi − pi)




e1 − η1 (m1 − p1)




2 − η2 (m2 − p2)
´
+ η1 (m1 − p1)
Plugging this expression into the second equation and after some tedious but straightfor-




(B − p2 + m2)η1η2 (λ2 + η2p2)+( η2)
2 (m2 − p2)(λ1 + η1p1)
η1λ2 + η2λ1 + η1η2 (p1 + p2)












pi (η2 (λ1 + p1η1)+η1 (λ2 + p2η2))
B.
It is straightforward to see that c
pr
i < 1 and, hence, that ˜ U
pr
i ≥ ηi (mi − pi). This com-
pletes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 7






is given by the utility levels
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˜ Uel














e1 − ˜ U
el
1 = e2 − ˜ U
el
2 ,
provided they fulﬁll the restriction that copayments have to be smaller or equal than 1.
Formally, for every i ∈ {1,2}
˜ U
el
i ≥ ηi (mi − pi)
From the second equation of the system we get
˜ U
el
1 = e1 − e2 + ˜ U
el
2





−(p1 + p2 − B)(η1 + η2)+η2 (e2 − e1 + η1 (m1 + m2))
η1 + η2











(p1 + p2 − B)η1 +( λj − λi)
pi (η1 + η2)
.
This is the solution, provided cel
i < 1 (i.e., ˜ Uel
i ≥ ηi (mi − pi)). It is direct to check that
c
el
i < 1 ⇐⇒ piηi + λi ≥ pjηj + λj − Bηj.
Otherwise, we have that cel
i =1and cel
j =1− B
pj. This completes the proof.
29